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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant Gerard Cardenas, a Mexican-American, 
was hired as of January 29, 1990 as the manager of the 
Office Systems Unit in the Information Systems Division 
("ISD") of New Jersey's Administrative Office of the Courts 
("AOC") following the retirement of Joseph Ribsam. 
Cardenas asserts that through 1989 every manager or 
supervisor in the ISD was a white non-Hispanic male. 
Appellee James Rebo, head of the ISD, had advertised the 
position at pay grades G-32 and G-30. Cardenas was 
appointed at the G-30 level. Cardenas resigned on March 1, 
1996. On August 23, 1996, he filed this suit against Jon 
Massey, his immediate supervisor, and Rebo (individually 
and in their official capacities), as well as Robert Lipscher, 
Director of the AOC (individually), James Ciancia 
(Lipscher's successor, in his official capacity), Deborah 
Poritz (New Jersey's Chief Justice, in her official capacity), 
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and the State of New Jersey. The complaint stated 
disparate pay, hostile work environment, and retaliation 
claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1981, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e, et seq. 
("Title VII"), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
("LAD"), N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-1, et seq., and a common law 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
Massey. Essentially, the claims raised in Cardenas' 128 
paragraph complaint revolve around his contention that he 
was hired at a lower grade level than merited by the work 
he was assigned, received disparate pay as a result, was 
not promoted as merited, was the subject of retaliation, and 
was subject to a hostile work environment, all as a result 
of his ethnicity. 
 
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment and Cardenas moved for partial summary 
judgment on his disparate pay claims. The District Court 
granted defendants' motion, except as to the LAD and 
S 1981 hostile work environment claims against defendant 
Massey, and denied Cardenas' motion by opinion dated 
December 2, 1999 (hereafter "Dec. 2 opinion"). The court 
subsequently denied Cardenas' motion for reargument by 
opinion dated February 2, 2000. Cardenas settled his 
claims against Massey, resolving the remainder of the 
action. He then filed a timely notice of appeal as to the 
remaining defendants. On appeal, the EEOC has filed an 
amicus curiae brief solely as to the issue of the proper 
application of the statute of limitations to disparate pay 
claims. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action under 
28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343, 1367. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Cardenas has set forth a litany of incidents from his six 
years employment at the AOC that he contends show 
discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. 
Our review of the grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
See Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for 
summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." An issue is genuine if "the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In Anderson , the Court 
explained that the judge's role when adjudicating a motion 
for summary judgment "is not himself to weigh the evidence 
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. In 
making this determination, a court is to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Berner Int'l 
Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 978 (3d Cir. 1993). 
In other words, Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon 
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322 (1986). 
 
III. 
 
Cardenas' disparate pay claims stem, at least in part, 
from his initial hiring at the G-30 level. Cardenas contends 
that he performed all of the responsibilities of his 
predecessor, who was Chief, Office Services Systems, a G- 
31, and came to assume additional ones (the "PC/LAN 
duties"). He contends that Richard Chelenza, another mid- 
level ISD manager, previously had the PC/LAN duties and, 
as a result, Chelenza's pay grade had been raised from G- 
31 to G-33 at Rebo's request. He claims he resolved LAN 
problems caused by inadequate materials supplied to the 
AOC by AT&T, negotiating a deal with the company 
whereby it replaced over $400,000 of defective materials 
and yet he remained at pay level G-30, the grade he held 
throughout his six-year tenure at the AOC.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. After June 1994, all AOC managers' salaries were frozen. It is not 
clear whether the freeze applied to promotions. 
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The District Court recognized that Cardenas asserted 
three legal bases for his wage discrimination claim-- 
S 1981, LAD, and Title VII, and that a separate limitations 
period applies to each. Cardenas' S 1981 claims are subject 
to a two-year statute of limitations. See Goodman v. Lukens 
Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2A:14-2. A two-year statute of limitations also applies to 
LAD claims whose "operative facts" occurred after July 27, 
1993, whereas LAD claims based on events occurring 
before this date are subject to a six-year statute of 
limitations. See Martinez v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 877 F. 
Supp. 219, 230 (D.N.J. 1994); Montells v. Haynes , 133 N.J. 
282, 286, 627 A.2d 654, 655 (1993). Title VII claims must 
be the subject of a charge filed with the EEOC within either 
180 days or 300 days of the complained-of unlawful 
employment practice, depending upon whether the state 
has an anti-discrimination law, see Miller v. Beneficial 
Mgmt. Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1992), and a 
complaint must be filed in the district court within 90 days 
of receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, see 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1). The District Court calculated that to 
maintain an action for disparate pay based on his pay 
grade under Title VII, Cardenas had to file a complaint with 
the EEOC on or before July 29, 19902; to maintain a S 1981 
action, he had to file his complaint in the district court on 
or before January 29, 1992; and to maintain an action 
under LAD, he had to file his complaint in the district court 
on or before January 29, 1996. 
 
The District Court found that because Cardenas' 
disparate pay claims stem from his initial pay grade 
classification, they accrued when he began working at the 
AOC on January 29, 1990, and are therefore time-barred. 
It rejected Cardenas' argument that each paycheck he 
received over the course of his AOC employment, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The court incorrectly believed that under Title VII Cardenas' claims 
had to be presented to the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful 
employment practice. In fact, because New Jersey has an anti- 
discrimination law, a claim must be presented to the EEOC within 300 
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(e)(1), construed in Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Prods., 776 
F.2d 56, 61-62 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
                                5 
 
 
ended on March 1, 1996, constituted a separate 
discriminatory act that brought his claims within the 
statutes of limitations pursuant to the continuing violations 
doctrine. See Miller, 977 F.2d at 842 ("[I]f the alleged 
discriminatory conduct is a `continuing violation,' the 
statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last 
occurrence of discrimination, rather than the first."). Citing, 
inter alia, Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 
(1989), rev'd by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, S 112, 
Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980), 
and United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 
(1977), the court found the continuing violations doctrine 
inapplicable because Cardenas described his pay checks as 
"consequences" of his pay grade and did not allege the 
AOC's pay-grade structure was facially discriminatory. 
 
We believe that is too narrow a reading of the facts and 
the law. In Evans, the discrimination, which was forcing 
plaintiff to resign when she married, occurred outside the 
statutory period. Although she was rehired within the 
statutory period, her seniority was calculated from the date 
of her re-hire. The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff 's 
argument that this application of the seniority system 
constituted a continuing violation because it gave present 
effect to the employer's past discriminatory act by 
disregarding the seniority she had accrued before her 
forced resignation. The Court held that no present violation 
existed because the seniority system, its adoption, and its 
operation were nondiscriminatory. See Evans, 431 U.S. at 
557-60. 
 
In Ricks, the employer College denied the plaintiff 
professor tenure and gave him a "terminal" one-year 
contract pursuant to College policy. The tenure denial was 
outside the statutory period, but plaintiff 's final day of 
employment was not, and he argued that his discharge was 
a continuing violation. The Court disagreed, finding that it 
was "a delayed, but inevitable, consequence of the denial of 
tenure. In order for the limitations periods to commence 
with the date of discharge, Ricks would have had to allege 
and prove that the manner in which his employment was 
terminated differed discriminatorily from the manner in 
which the College terminated other professors who also had 
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been denied tenure." Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-58. The Court 
cited Evans for the proposition that we look not for 
continuing effects but for present acts of discrimination. Id. 
 
In Lorance, the plaintiffs were demoted under a facially 
neutral seniority system, operated in a non-discriminatory 
manner but allegedly adopted with a discriminatory 
purpose outside the statutory period. The Court, citing 
Evans, Ricks, and the special status of seniority systems in 
discrimination law, Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911-12, declined 
to apply the continuing violations doctrine, holding that 
"[b]ecause the claimed invalidity of the . . . seniority system 
is wholly dependent on the alleged illegality of signing the 
underlying [collective bargaining] agreement, it is the date 
of that signing which governs the limitations period." Id. at 
911. 
 
In all three cases, the Supreme Court held there was no 
continuing violation where the effects of prior 
discriminatory acts, but no actual discrimination, occurred 
within the limitations period. The Evans-Ricks-Lorance line 
of cases bars claims where the relevant aspect of the 
employment system (such as promotion, seniority, or 
termination) is facially neutral, and any discrete 
discriminatory conduct took place and ceased outside the 
period of limitations. As the Lorance Court observed, "[w]ith 
a facially neutral system the discriminatory act occurs only 
at the time of adoption, for each application is 
nondiscriminatory." Id. at 912 n.5. However, this line of 
cases does not bar claims based on conduct which is 
alleged to have "continued to discriminate unlawfully each 
time it was applied." Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 
336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 
Here, Cardenas alleges the decision not to promote him, 
or increase his wage level to one appropriate to his skills, 
was made on an ongoing basis. The facially-neutral-system 
analysis of Evans, Ricks, and Lorance is thus inapposite. A 
more pertinent Supreme Court decision is Bazemore v. 
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), where the Court reversed the 
dismissal of a Title VII disparate pay claim on statute of 
limitations grounds and held that each of plaintiffs' pay 
checks constituted a distinct violation of their right to 
nondiscriminatory compensation. The Court stated that the 
 
                                7 
 
 
limitations defense could not be based on the ground that 
the disparities stemmed from discriminatory policies pre- 
dating the effective date of Title VII, explaining: 
 
       that the [employer] discriminated with respect to 
       salaries prior to the time it was covered by Title VII 
       does not excuse perpetuating that discrimination after 
       [it] became covered by Title VII. . . . A pattern or 
       practice that would have constituted a violation of Title 
       VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet 
       become effective, became a violation upon Title VII's 
       effective date, and to the extent an employer continued 
       to engage in that act or practice, it is liable under that 
       statute. . . . Each week's paycheck that delivers less to 
       a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong 
       actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this 
       pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII. 
 
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96 (third emphasis added) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, joined by all members of 
the Court). 
 
Thereafter, in Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp., 977 
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1992), a case brought under the Equal 
Pay Act rather than Title VII, this court came to a similar 
conclusion. We held that the statute of limitations for an 
EPA claim began to run on the date the plaintiff received 
her last allegedly discriminatory paycheck. In fact,"[m]ost 
courts appear to treat pay discrimination claims as 
continuing violations." Miller, 977 F.2d at 843. Certainly, in 
this circuit, " `discriminatory wage payments constitute a 
continuing violation. . . . To hold otherwise would permit 
perpetual wage discrimination by an employer whose 
violation . . . had already lasted without attack for [longer 
than the limitations period].' " Id.  (quoting Hodgson v. 
Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1050 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 
The EEOC filed its brief as amicus curiae in this case 
because of its view that the District Court erroneously 
applied the statute of limitations to Cardenas' Title VII 
claim. The EEOC states that "both Bazemore  and Miller 
contemplate that an individual may challenge allegedly 
discriminatory wage payments so long as one such 
payment falls within the limitations period." Br. of EEOC at 
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14. It further states that "Cardenas received allegedly 
discriminatory paychecks within 300 days prior to the filing 
of his administrative charge, and so his claim should have 
been deemed timely." Id. at 10. The EEOC argues that if the 
District Court's opinion is allowed to stand, it"would 
frustrate enforcement of Title VII by improperly insulating 
current discriminatory conduct from challenge under the 
statute." Id. at 1. 
 
In its opinion on Cardenas' request for reargument, the 
District Court rejected Cardenas' argument that it had 
overlooked the Miller decision. The court first noted that 
Cardenas had not cited Miller and then held that Miller was 
not controlling because it analyzed the statute of limitations 
under the Equal Pay Act whereas Cardenas sued under 
Title VII. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Bazemore concerns a Title VII claim. Moreover, application 
of the continuing violations doctrine is not dependent on 
which statute gives rise to the plaintiff 's claim. See 
Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 345-51 
(4th Cir. 1994) (applying continuing violation theory to both 
Title VII and EPA disparate pay claims). Although Miller 
may have been brought under a different statute, its 
holding is still applicable here. Cf. Miller, 977 F.2d at 843 
(relying in part on Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (Title VII and EPA) and Satz v. I.T.T. Fin. Corp., 
619 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1990) (Title VII)). Finally, there are 
numerous cases in other circuits that have followed the 
Bazemore decision to hold that in a Title VII case claiming 
discriminatory pay, the receipt of each paycheck is a 
continuing violation. See, e.g., Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 
F.3d 329, 335-37 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ashley v. Boyle's 
Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167-68 (8th Cir. 
1995) (en banc); Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 345-51. 
 
The defendants seek to uphold the summary judgment 
on the disparate pay claim on the ground that the 
undisputed facts show that any difference in pay between 
the employees in the ISD unit who also had the title of 
project manager "was a result of the varying degrees of 
seniority, experience, education and difference in job 
responsibilities." Br. of Appellees at 19. It may, indeed, be 
true that whatever differences existed were the result of 
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factors other than ethnicity and that the failure to promote 
Cardenas to a level that he claims would have been 
consistent with his responsibilities may have been due to 
his failure to request and/or merit promotion. However, 
because the District Court disposed of the disparate pay 
claim on the basis of the statute of limitations rather than 
any merits factor, we cannot reach those issues but will 
leave them to the District Court on remand.3 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
District Court's order granting summary judgment for 
defendants on Cardenas' disparate pay claims and remand 
the case for a determination on the merits. 
 
IV. 
 
Cardenas contends he became subject to a hostile work 
environment after Jon Massey became his immediate 
supervisor on March 7, 1991 pursuant to an ISD 
reorganization. According to Cardenas, Massey subjected 
him to ethnic slurs and comments, beginning with their 
initial interview and continuing through 1994. Among other 
things, Massey allegedly called Cardenas the "boy from the 
barrio," app. at 1185, asked Cardenas why he had 
anglicized his name, and regularly dealt with professional 
disagreements by questioning whether Cardenas intended 
to pull out a switchblade. Until 1993, Cardenas also found 
derogatory anonymous messages on the marker board in 
his cubicle, which he believes Massey wrote. The most 
offensive message used the word "mojado," which means 
"wetback." App. at 895, 1189. 
 
He further contends that Massey discriminated against 
him in completing performance evaluations.4 Regarding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Nor do we decide whether the initial decision to hire Cardenas at a 
level 30 was due to ethnicity or, as defendants argue, the policy or 
practice not to hire any new hire at level 32. We will give the District 
Court the opportunity to decide in the first instance whether it is a 
separate claim or survives the statute of limitations bar because it is 
inextricably bound to the disparate pay claim. 
 
4. The AOC performance evaluations consist of ten component ratings 
and an overall rating. The component categories are: (1) knowledge of 
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Massey's disparate performance evaluations, Cardenas has 
provided evidence that appears to show that Massey 
regularly rounded up the component ratings when 
determining the overall scores of non Hispanic subordinates 
but rounded down when calculating ratings of Cardenas, 
sometimes to the point of rating Cardenas lower overall 
than white employees with lower component ratings. 5 
Cardenas contends that Rebo also discriminated against 
him, though more subtly than Massey. For example, he 
points out that Rebo assigned minorities and trainees 
disproportionately to his unit and claims that Rebo 
tarnished his reputation by spreading the word that he was 
an affirmative-action hire. He further notes that Rebo 
reviewed each of Massey's performance evaluations (of 
Cardenas and of Massey's other subordinates) before they 
were issued, and had the authority to change the ratings. 
App. at 971-73. 
 
Finally, Cardenas asserts Rebo and Massey collectively 
impeded his job performance through other facially neutral 
management devices, such as knowingly contradictory 
instructions and assignments incompatible with his staff 
resources. He claims that Massey insisted Cardenas obey 
him even when he contradicted Rebo and did not defend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
work, (2) attendance history, (3) quantity of work, (4) quality of work, 
(5) 
planning and organization, (6) initiative, (7) mental ability, (8) 
analytical 
ability and judgment, (9) leadership, and (10) development of personnel. 
The evaluator gives the employee one of five rankings (unsatisfactory, 
marginal, satisfactory, commendable, and outstanding/superior) for each 
category and an overall rating. See, e.g., App. at 206-13. 
 
5. Cardenas assigned each rating a number, from 0 to 4, then calculated 
his "GPA" from the ratings in the component categories, which he then 
compared to the overall ratings. Massey gave Cardenas an overall rating 
of "satisfactory" or "2" for GPAs of 2.5, 2.4, and 2.6, and an overall 
rating of "marginal" or "1" for a GPA of 1.7. App. at 474-505. By 
contrast, Massey gave other subordinates overall ratings of 
"commendable" or "3" for GPAs of 2.4, 2.55, 2.6, and 2.6, and a 
"satisfactory +" or "2.5" for a GPA of 2.2. App. at 896-935. Notably, 
Cardenas himself received an overall rating of "commendable" or "3" for 
a GPA of 2.6 in an evaluation he received from his previous supervisor. 
App. at 216-23. We express no opinion on the accuracy of Cardenas' 
rating system, an issue for the trier of fact. 
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Cardenas when his express directives got Cardenas into 
trouble. 
 
Cardenas claims that he complained to Massey, Rebo, 
Lipscher, Bobby Battle (the AOC's Equal Employment 
Opportunity ("EEO") Officer), and Human Resources 
personnel about Massey's harassment to no avail. He 
asserts that Battle refused to address the problem 
informally and that the harassment continued unabated 
until Cardenas submitted a formal complaint on December 
30, 1994, which he had been reluctant to do for fear of 
retaliation. Defendants emphasize that Cardenas made no 
allegations of specific discrimination to anyone in the AOC 
until the summer of 1994, and that many of his complaints 
were non-specific or accompanied by requests that the 
particular incident be treated as minor or that he be left to 
deal with the problem on his own to avoid reprisals. 
 
The failure to complain to higher management did not 
defeat plaintiffs' Title VII claims in Faragher v. Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998), or Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1998), and we see no reason 
why the failure to file a formal complaint would defeat 
Cardenas' claim here. As noted, he did subsequently file a 
complaint pursuant to the AOC procedures. Thus, at most, 
if Cardenas sent a mixed message, it would be an issue 
going to his credibility as to the severity of the harassment. 
 
Cardenas did not complete providing detailed allegations 
for his EEO complaint until March 1995. On March 3, 
1995, the AOC rejected his request that he and his entire 
unit be transferred out of the ISD immediately, but offered 
him three temporary alternative work assignments for the 
pendency of the EEO investigation. Cardenas asserts that 
the options were unacceptable because they either left him 
under Rebo's or Massey's supervision or demoted him by 
removing his management responsibilities. Moreover, 
Cardenas claims that when he nonetheless professed 
interest in one option, his efforts to accept it were 
stonewalled. On April 6, 1995, he filed a charge with the 
EEOC. 
 
Cardenas contends that the internal EEO investigation 
was overly long, pointing out that the investigators did not 
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send charges to Rebo and Massey until June 1995, and 
then granted their request for an extension to respond. The 
EEO did not issue a report until October 30, 1995. 
Cardenas received a copy of the report in November 1995. 
He argues that the report's conclusion finding "no evidence 
of discrimination," App. at 285, is unfounded. He also notes 
that the investigation did not address his disparate pay 
claim. 
 
Cardenas has also asserted a claim of retaliation which 
he attributes to his engaging in three protected activities in 
1994 and 1995 known to Massey and Rebo. He supported 
a subordinate's sexual harassment allegations against Rebo 
in June 1994, filed a formal discrimination complaint 
against Massey and Rebo with the AOC's EEO that 
December, and offered to support a lateral job applicant's 
EEO complaint against Massey in January 1995. Cardenas 
claims to have suffered retaliation from Rebo and Massey 
for his protected activities. He cites, for example, an 
allegedly undeservedly low performance evaluation in 
August 1994, a threat of discipline which sent him to the 
hospital with stress-induced chest pains, increased 
personnel disruptions in his unit, and an unusual 
summons to the human resources department which 
provoked a second stress attack severe enough to warrant 
a second hospital visit. 
 
In November 1995, allegedly realizing he could not 
salvage his job, Cardenas began looking for new 
employment. He left the AOC on March 1, 1996, and 
received his "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC on May 28, 
1996. 
 
A hostile work environment, first recognized by the 
Supreme Court as a basis for a discrimination claim under 
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinsen , 477 U.S. 
57, 65-68 (1986), in a case claiming sexual harassment, is 
now established as a basis for various discrimination 
claims. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-87 
(1998) (discussing the Court's "repeated" clarifications of 
the foundations of hostile work environment claims). In 
order to establish a hostile work environment claim under 
Title VII, Cardenas must show that (1) he suffered 
intentional discrimination because of his national origin; (2) 
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the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) it 
detrimentally affected him; (4) it would have detrimentally 
affected a reasonable person of the same protected class in 
his position; and (5) there is a basis for vicarious liability. 
See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 
1081 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
In considering whether Cardenas has established the 
elements of a hostile work environment claim, the record 
must be evaluated as a whole to decide whether the 
plaintiff has proved his or her case, because "[p]articularly 
in the discrimination area, it is often difficult to determine 
the motivations of an action and any analysis is filled with 
pitfalls and ambiguities. . . . [A] discrimination analysis 
must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the 
overall scenario." Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 
139, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted); see also 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) 
("Whether an environment is `hostile' . . . can be determined 
only by looking at all the circumstances."). Title VII applies 
to both "facially neutral mistreatment . . .[and] overt 
[ethnic] discrimination . . . [which] in sum constitute[ ] the 
hostile work environment." Id. at 148; 6 see also Aman, 85 
F.3d at 1081-84 (discussing the increased sophistication of 
modern violators, the obligation of courts to be 
"increasingly vigilant" against subtle forms of 
discrimination, and the importance of allowing plaintiffs to 
prove discrimination indirectly: "[i]n light of the suspicious 
remarks [arguably racial slurs] . . . , a reasonable jury 
could interpret [facially neutral] behavior[such as stolen 
time cards] as part of a complex tapestry of 
discrimination"). 
 
The District Court accepted that Massey's alleged 
remarks and the anonymous marker-board messages 
satisfied the causation element of the hostile work 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We draw here on standards developed in sexual harassment cases. As 
the Supreme Court observed in Faragher,"[a]lthough racial and sexual 
harassment will often take different forms, and standards may not be 
entirely interchangeable, we think there is good sense in seeking 
generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable 
harassment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (1998). 
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environment claims but noted that "some of the other 
allegedly hostile actions taken by the [appellees] were not 
overtly ethnically based." Dec. 2 opinion at 20. However, 
reviewing the totality of defendants' alleged discriminatory 
conduct as required by Durham, the District Court 
concluded that Cardenas' "only factual allegations . . . that 
arguably can be considered severe and pervasive instances 
of ethnically hostile conduct are [his] claims regarding 
Massey's disparaging comments about [Cardenas'] 
ethnicity." Id. at 24. The court held that assigning minority 
workers to a minority manager's unit does not create a 
hostile environment, found that Cardenas "failed to come 
forward with any evidence . . . indicat[ing] racial hostility 
infected the [performance] evaluation process," id. at 23, 
and found no evidence that Massey and Rebo set Cardenas 
up to fail. Although the District Court agreed that Cardenas 
had presented evidence of ethnic animus on Massey's part, 
the court stated that "a plaintiff cannot prove a case of 
ethnic discrimination merely by . . . raising the specter of 
discrimination over otherwise legitimate management 
decisions that may have negatively impacted a minority 
employee." Id. at 24. 
 
We cannot say that the District Court's evaluation of the 
evidence was not a reasonable one for a trier of fact to 
reach. However, the District Court declined to examine the 
possibility that defendants' "management decisions" 
masked discriminatory intent. As this court has previously 
emphasized, the advent of more sophisticated and subtle 
forms of discrimination requires that we analyze the 
aggregate effect of all evidence and reasonable inferences 
therefrom, including those concerning incidents of facially 
neutral mistreatment, in evaluating a hostile work 
environment claim. See Durham, 166 F.3d at 148-49; 
Aman, 85 F.3d at 1081-84. 
 
In addition to the oral and written ethnic slurs cited by 
the District Court, Cardenas has provided evidence from 
which a jury might find ethnic animus underlying other 
ostensibly nondiscriminatory incidents. For example, 
disproportionate assignment of minority employees to the 
only unit supervised by a minority manager might create an 
impression of, or be motivated by an intent to achieve, 
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segregation. Likewise, consistently lower performance 
evaluations for a protected class member as compared to 
non-protected co-workers may indicate discriminatory  
intent.7 
 
Defendants contest the manner in which Cardenas has 
made numerical equivalents, but Cardenas' figures create 
an inference strong enough that we cannot disregard the 
evidence for purposes of summary judgment. The AOC's 
evaluation process is subjective and a jury could conclude 
that Massey, who allegedly subjected Cardenas to 
ethnically-charged comments, was motivated by ethnic 
animus in giving Cardenas lower overall ratings than white 
employees when Cardenas had higher component ratings. 
Similarly, a jury could find that Rebo might reasonably 
have been expected to notice and address this suspect 
pattern. 
 
Finally, Cardenas has provided evidence from which a 
jury could conclude that Rebo and Massey set him up to 
fail. Cf. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (one of many factors which 
may indicate hostile work environment is "whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work 
performance.").8 For example, Cardenas testified at his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. One commentator has written of the effect of similar conduct in sexual 
harassment situations. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1687 (1998) cited with approval in Durham 
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (observing that 
some prevalent forms of sexual harassment include"denigrating 
[victims'] performance . . . , providing sexist evaluations of [victims'] 
performance or denying them deserved promotions, . .. denying [victims] 
the perks or privileges that are required for success, . . . [and] 
engaging 
in taunting, pranks, and other forms of hazing designed to remind 
[victims] that they are different and out of place."). 
 
8. "To render visible many of the . . . forms of harassment that remain 
hidden, we should also recognize that much of the behavior that creates 
a hostile working environment is conduct that has the purpose or effect 
of undermining the perceived or actual competence of[the victim of 
discrimination]." Schultz, supra note 7, at 1762. Indeed, "there are 
diverse ways of subverting a [victim's] perceived or actual competence. 
Sometimes it takes the form of deliberate sabotage of a [victim's] work 
performance, such as . . . simply assigning her tasks that are impossible 
to accomplish." Id. at 1764. (internal citations omitted). 
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deposition regarding an incident where, pursuant to 
Massey's orders, he curtailed the scope of a presentation 
requested by Rebo, and was publicly berated by Rebo as a 
result. App. at 1017-18. If true, this may be analogous to 
incidents referred to in Durham which were included as 
constituting a hostile workplace. 166 F.3d at 145-46. He 
also claims that he was given assignments too complicated 
for his unit, which had a disproportionately high number of 
trainees, to complete successfully. See id. 
 
The District Court determined that a jury could conclude 
that Cardenas' allegations regarding the ethnically 
harassing comments by Massey were severe and pervasive 
enough and would offend a reasonable person, satisfying 
the elements of the hostile work environment claim as to 
Massey. Feb. 2 op. at 25. However, it found "a paucity of 
credible evidence" showing that the other defendants acted 
in a discriminatory manner based on Cardenas' ethnicity. 
Id. at 24. Although Cardenas may not have presented as 
much evidence as did plaintiffs in other hostile workplace 
environment cases, we cannot conclude that he has not 
presented enough evidence to make a genuine issue of 
material fact. We believe that a jury could determine that 
this hostile work environment stemmed from several forms 
of facially neutral mistreatment as well as from Massey's 
facially discriminatory comments. 
 
We have no reason to believe the result would be any 
different under the LAD. To establish a hostile work 
environment claim under the LAD, a plaintiff "must 
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct (1) would not 
have occurred but for the employee's [national origin]; and 
[the conduct] was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a 
(3) reasonable [person of the same protected class] believe 
that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the 
working environment is hostile or abusive." Taylor v. 
Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 498, 706 A.2d 685, 688-89 (1998) 
(quotations omitted). The elements of this claim closely 
resemble the first four elements of the Title VII hostile work 
environment claim. Moreover, like this court, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court requires a cumulative analysis of the 
incidents comprising an alleged hostile work environment. 
See Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 607, 626 
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A.2d 445, 455 (1993). Therefore, our discussion of the Title 
VII claim above applies with equal force to this claim's basic 
elements. We conclude that Cardenas has provided 
sufficient evidence of an actionable hostile work 
environment under the LAD to survive summary judgment. 
 
Cardenas also claims retaliation as another basis for 
liability. The District Court recognized that to establish a 
prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII,S 1981, or the 
LAD, Cardenas must show: (1) that he engaged in a 
protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (3) that there was a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action. Dec. 2 opinion at 38; see Robinson v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997) (Title 
VII); Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 
1996) (LAD); Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., 893 F. Supp. 316, 
335 (D.N.J. 1995) (S 1981). 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment for 
defendants on Cardenas' retaliation claims, finding that 
Cardenas had not shown that he engaged in a protected 
activity or, assuming Cardenas suffered an adverse 
employment action, any causal relationship between that 
activity and the actions that were allegedly retaliatory. Dec. 
2 op. at 39. We are satisfied that Cardenas has pointed to 
evidence that he engaged in three protected activities 
between June 1994 and January 1995 in the form of his 
own discrimination complaint and his cooperation in the 
complaints of two other individuals. 
 
In Robinson, we stated that an adverse employment 
action is one which is "serious and tangible enough to alter 
an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment." See 120 F.3d at 1300. Cardenas 
claims that his resignation was a constructive discharge, 
which we will assume arguendo would constitute an 
adverse employment action. "In order to establish a 
constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that the 
employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination 
in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person 
subject to them would resign." Aman, 85 F.3d at 1084 
(quotations omitted). A "continuous pattern of 
discriminatory treatment over a period of years" may 
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constitute "intolerable" conditions even without a particular 
egregious precipitating incident. Id. ("The fact that Aman 
had been subject to continuous discrimination during her 
employment could support a conclusion that she simply 
had had enough. No other precipitating facts were legally 
required."). 
 
The District Court was willing to assume for purposes of 
summary judgment that Cardenas suffered a constructive 
discharge but found missing evidence of any causal link to 
any of the alleged protected activity. As to the poor 
performance evaluation, which Cardenas also cites here as 
retaliatory, the District Court concluded that Cardenas 
failed to show that the improper performance evaluation 
was causally related to Cardenas' engaging in any protected 
activity. Dec. 2 opinion at 40. 
 
We are, of course, cognizant of our obligation to view the 
record and submissions of the parties so that we may draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
As is evident from the foregoing, we have been able to find 
enough evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue 
of material fact as to the existence of a hostile work 
environment. We have been unable to find any such issue 
with respect to the required causal element in Cardenas' 
retaliation claim. He contends that the evaluation that 
rated the work he performed through August 1995 as 
"marginal," the lowest he ever received, was not presented 
to him until after the completion of the EEO report. There 
have been cases in which the temporal relation between an 
adverse employment action and the protected activity has 
enabled the court to draw the inference of causal 
relationship. See, e.g., Jalil v. Advel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 
708 (3d Cir. 1989) (inferring causation when discharge 
occurred two days after employer's notice of plaintiff 's 
EEOC complaint). However, "temporal proximity alone will 
be insufficient to establish the necessary causal connection 
when the temporal relationship is not `unusually 
suggestive.' " Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 
271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Krouse v. American 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)). The 
temporal relationship in this case is, alone, insufficient to 
establish causation, because the alleged protected activity 
 
                                19 
 
 
took place over a substantial period of time and any routine 
employment action taken during that period would 
necessarily be related temporally. In such circumstances, 
there would have to be another basis to permit the 
inference of a causal relationship. 
 
Although we have held that many of the employment 
actions to which Cardenas points as retaliatory were part of 
the fabric of incidents from which a factfinder could 
conclude made for a hostile work environment, it was 
Massey's overt ethnic hostility that formed the thread 
between the employment actions and the alleged hostile 
environment. There is no similar basis to form a thread 
between the same otherwise routine employment actions 
and the protected activity. Our finding such a thread would 
be sheer speculation. Under that circumstance, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court granting 
defendants summary judgment on Cardenas' retaliation 
claim. 
 
V. 
 
Having determined that the District Court's dismissal of 
Cardenas' claim for disparate pay on the basis of the 
statute of limitations was erroneous as a matter of law and 
that its grant of summary judgment for the defendants on 
liability for a hostile workplace cannot be sustained, we 
must decide which claim survives as to which defendant. 
Inasmuch as Cardenas settled with Massey, the defendant 
with the most direct culpability, we consider only the 
claims against the other defendants. 
 
The District Court, having dismissed the disparate pay 
claims, never considered which defendants would be liable 
if Cardenas were to prevail on the merits of that claim. Dec. 
2 opinion at 17. We believe it appropriate for the District 
Court to consider that issue in the first instance. We 
therefore limit our consideration to the question of liability 
on the hostile work environment claim. Of course, if 
Cardenas does not prevail, there would be no reason to 
consider relief as to any of the defendants. Nonetheless, we 
proceed to consider whether there are other grounds to 
affirm the District Court's dismissals as to each defendant 
at this stage. 
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Cardenas seeks only equitable relief from Chief Justice 
Poritz and Ciancia. He seeks an injunction requiring them 
to implement specific anti-discrimination policies at the 
AOC and alter his employment records retroactively to 
reflect, contrary to fact, a higher pay-grade classification 
and more favorable performance evaluations. In support of 
his position, Cardenas cites authority for the proposition 
that Title VII, S 1981, and the LAD all provide for equitable 
relief, see 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g)(1) (Title VII); Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) 
(S 1981); Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 441, 
561 A.2d 1130 (1989) (LAD), and contends that he"cannot 
obtain the whole remedy that Title VII specifically promises 
and that is implicit in S 1981 and the LAD" without the 
equitable relief he seeks, Br. for Appellant at 62. 
 
Because Cardenas is no longer employed by the AOC, he 
will not be affected by its implementation of, or failure to 
implement, new anti-discrimination policies. Therefore, a 
change in AOC anti-discrimination policies will not make 
him "whole" or remedy violations he contends the 
defendants committed.9 Regarding Cardenas' novel request 
for an injunction requiring the AOC to alter his 
performance evaluations and pay-grade classification to 
reflect not what they actually were but what they would 
have been without discrimination, he has presented no 
precedent, nor have we found one, granting equitable relief 
which would require a public agency to complete its records 
counterfactually. We therefore affirm the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment to Ciancia and Poritz regarding 
Cardenas' claim for equitable relief. 
 
We consider next whether there is any basis on which 
Cardenas could maintain his claims for a hostile work 
environment against the state of New Jersey. The Supreme 
Court recently reviewed the standard for Title VII employer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. To the extent he seeks relief for perceived ongoing discrimination at 
the AOC against current employees, he has presented no evidence of 
such discrimination and cannot in any case assert the rights of the 
employees. See O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(citing "the principle that one cannot sue for the deprivation of 
another's 
civil rights") (quotations omitted). 
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liability in the context of sexual harassment and clarified 
that agency principles apply. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). An employer is liable for acts 
committed by its employees in the scope of their 
employment, which may include some types of disparate 
treatment of employees by supervisors, such as 
discriminatory reprimands or job assignments. See 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798-99. Pure harassment (e.g., ethnic 
slurs) is not within the scope of employment and the Court 
suggested that hostile work environment cases will most 
often properly be analyzed under the rubric of either 
employer negligence or vicarious liability. See id. at 802-07; 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757-59. 
 
The Court held that employers are subject to vicarious 
liability under Title VII for hostile work environments 
created by supervisory employees. However, it also 
enunciated an affirmative defense limiting this liability 
when the plaintiff has not suffered a tangible adverse 
employment action. The defense depends on the 
reasonableness of both the employer's and the plaintiff 's 
preventative and remedial measures. Specifically, the Court 
held: 
 
       An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a 
       victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
       environment created by a supervisor with immediate 
       (or successively higher) authority over the employee. 
       When no tangible employment action is taken, a 
       defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to 
       liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
       preponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense 
       comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the 
       employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
       correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
       (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to 
       take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
       opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
       harm otherwise. . . . No affirmative defense is available, 
       however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates 
       in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, 
       demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. 
 
In this case, the District Court held that although 
Cardenas had made a prima facie case showing a hostile 
work environment based on Massey's ethnically disparaging 
comments, the undisputed evidence "shows that the 
defendants took reasonable steps to prevent harassment in 
the workplace, and the plaintiff failed to avail himself of the 
AOC's complaint procedure until December, 1994." Dec. 2 
opinion at 34. The court continued, "[o]nce the plaintiff did 
file a complaint, the undisputed evidence shows that the 
AOC took immediate, albeit temporary, remedial measures 
while it conducted an investigation, and the harassment 
stopped." Id. 
 
Cardenas does not have to prove at this stage that New 
Jersey is liable for a hostile work environment. Instead, he 
need merely show that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact that it may be held liable for employer liability. If 
Cardenas does prove the existence of a hostile work 
environment, New Jersey will be liable if (1) Cardenas 
shows that Massey's overt harassment or Rebo's more 
subtle approach led to a tangible employment action or (2) 
one of the two bases for an Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense as to employer supervisory liability is not available. 
Cardenas argues that his resignation from the AOC was in 
fact a constructive discharge which would constitute a 
tangible employment action and preclude New Jersey from 
using the Ellerth/Faragher defense. 10 If Cardenas convinces 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. There 
appears to be some disagreement on whether constructive discharge 
constitutes a tangible employment action. Compare Caridad v. Metro 
North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating 
"constructive discharge does not constitute a`tangible employment 
action' as that term is used in Ellerth and Faragher.") with Durham Life 
Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (observing "[u]nder 
[plaintiff]'s theory, any substantial adverse action . . . would not be a 
tangible adverse employment action if it led the affected employee to quit 
before the demotion took effect. This is contrary to Title VII doctrine, 
which recognizes a constructive discharge under such circumstances.") 
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a jury that he was victimized by a hostile work environment 
created by Massey or Rebo, it is certainly possible that the 
same jury would find that the hostile environment was 
severe enough to have precipitated Cardenas' resignation, 
i.e., a constructive discharge. We have found that Cardenas 
presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact on 
the existence of a hostile work environment. It follows that 
he presented enough to survive summary judgment on the 
constructive discharge issue, and hence New Jersey's 
employer liability. 
 
Even if the alleged hostile work environment had not 
culminated in a tangible employment action, summary 
judgment for New Jersey based on the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense, which the District Court found dispositive, would 
be premature. There are factual issues outstanding as to 
the reasonableness of the parties' respective actions. As the 
District Court pointed out, Cardenas did delay before filing 
a formal EEO complaint and did refuse the alternative 
positions the AOC offered him. On the other hand, he had 
complained informally to Rebo, Massey, and Battle, the 
EEO Officer, and Battle refused to address Cardenas' 
concerns without a formal complaint. In these 
circumstances, Cardenas' reluctance to file a formal 
complaint for fear of aggravating the situation or branding 
himself a troublemaker might not have been unreasonable. 
 
Cardenas argues that the AOC's published anti- 
discrimination policy and complaint procedure, on which 
the District Court relied, was insufficient to satisfy 
Ellerth/Faragher for a number of reasons. Cardenas asserts 
that the investigators declined to re-interview him when he 
insisted that his lawyer be present but instead adopted 
Massey's explanation of the alleged ethnic slurs; the report 
was issued seven months after he submitted his detailed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and Cherry v. Menard Inc., 101 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1171 (W.D. Iowa 2000) 
("This court, however, does not agree with the decisions reached in 
Caridad."). 
 
We leave this issue to the District Court in the first instance. For 
purposes of this discussion, we assume a constructive discharge is a 
tangible employment action. 
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discrimination allegations (ten months after his initial, 
formal complaint) and during that period he remained 
under the supervision of Massey and Rebo, allegedly 
subject to continuing discrimination; the AOC allegedly did 
not respond to his e-mail asking for protection against 
ongoing retaliation; the alternative positions offered to 
Cardenas pending the investigation purportedly either left 
him under the supervision of Rebo or Massey or effectively 
demoted him by eliminating or significantly decreasing his 
managerial duties, and his effort to find out more about, 
and possibly accept, one of the positions was stonewalled; 
and the internal investigation failed to address his 
disparate pay claim and concluded that there was no 
discrimination and therefore offered him no relief. 
Inasmuch as we cannot rule out a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to whether the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense would be available to New Jersey, we 
cannot sustain the grant of summary judgment on the Title 
VII claim as to New Jersey. 
 
Similarly, New Jersey may be liable under its own LAD. 
Under New Jersey's LAD, employers are liable under 
traditional agency principles. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Adamar 
of N.J., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10902, *39 (D.N.J. July 
31, 2001) ("Suits brought against the State as an employer 
are clearly within the scope of the explicit waiver of 
sovereign immunity contained in [the LAD]"); Newsome v. 
Administrative Office of Courts, 103 F.Supp.2d 807, 821 
(D.N.J. 2000) ("As with Title VII, under the LAD, traditional 
agency principles govern the extent to which the[employer] 
may be liable for compensatory damages for [a supervisor's] 
actions. When a supervisor . . . , acting within the scope of 
his employment, harasses an employee under his 
supervision, the employer is vicariously liable."). 
 
It remains to consider whether there is a basis also to 
retain as defendants the two remaining named individuals, 
Rebo and Lipscher. Although claims against individual 
supervisors are not permitted under Title VII, see, e.g., 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 
1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), this court has 
found individual liability under S 1981 "when [the 
defendants] intentionally cause an infringement of rights 
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protected by Section 1981, regardless of whether the 
[employer] may also be held liable." See Al-Khazraji v. Saint 
Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 
Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F.Supp.2d 512, 540-41 
(D.N.J. 2000). In Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 
701 (1989), the Supreme Court held S 1983 provides the 
" `exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the 
rights guaranteed by S 1981 when the claim is pressed 
against a state actor.' " Following Jett , Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 which amended S 1981 to provide 
that "rights protected by this section are protected against 
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and 
impairment under color of State law." 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981(c)(1994). As a district court has noted, "[f]ederal 
courts have disagreed whether S 1981(c) abrogates Jett by 
creating an implied independent cause of action." Meachum 
v. Temple Univ., 42 F.Supp.2d 533, 541 n.9. (E.D. Pa. 
1999); see also Jones v. School Dist., 198 F.3d 403, 414-15 
(3d Cir. 1999); Santiago, 107 F.Supp.2d at 540 n.17 (D.N.J. 
2000) (suggesting it is an open question in this circuit 
whether S 1981 claims are available against state actors). 
 
Under the LAD a supervisory employee may be liable for 
discrimination for aiding and abetting another's (the 
employer's) violation. See Hurley, 174 F.3d at 126; see also 
Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("[A] person is liable for harm resulting to a third person 
from the conduct of another when he knows that the 
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives 
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself.") (quotation omitted). Moreover, a 
supervisor has a duty under New Jersey law to act against 
harassment, and a supervisor's violation of this duty by 
either deliberate indifference or affirmative harassment 
subjects the supervisor to LAD liability. Hurley , 174 F.3d at 
128 (citing New Jersey cases); see also id. at 126 (failure to 
act may qualify as aiding and abetting when it rises to the 
level of "substantial assistance or encouragement.") 
(quotation omitted). 
 
We need not reach that issue as to Lipscher because the 
only evidence implicating Lipscher in discriminatory 
activities is his ultimate responsibility for the investigation 
 
                                26 
 
 
as the AOC Director. There is no evidence suggesting that 
he was aware of, but ignored, Cardenas' cries for help or 
defects in the investigation. There is no evidence that 
Lipscher discriminated against Cardenas or was 
deliberately indifferent to the discrimination he suffered. 
The evidence indicates that Lipscher had little contact with 
Cardenas and that he did not make the type of daily 
managerial decisions Cardenas claims masked Massey's 
and Rebo's discriminatory intent. There is no evidence that 
Lipscher had any reason to believe Cardenas' direct 
supervisors were breaching their duty not to discriminate. 
Lipscher's acceptance of the investigator's report, which 
Cardenas characterizes as a "whitewash" and which 
excused Massey's derogatory comments (or purported to 
explain why they were not derogatory), does not create a 
genuine issue as to his discriminatory intent. Cardenas has 
not presented any evidence that Lipscher had reason to 
believe the report was inaccurate, incomplete, or in bad 
faith. No reasonable jury could find that Lipscher aided or 
abetted any discrimination against Cardenas. The evidence 
shows that Lipscher took Cardenas' complaint seriously, 
assigned an investigator to the case, and accepted the 
investigator's report. We agree with the District Court that 
a reasonable jury could not find any basis for liability as to 
Lipscher, either individually or in his official capacity. 
 
Retention of Rebo is, of course, a different matter. The 
majority of the behavior which Cardenas found offensive 
was perpetrated by either Rebo or Massey. Whether Rebo 
was involved in, or deliberately indifferent to, many of the 
allegedly discriminatory actions contributing to the claimed 
hostile work environment is an issue of fact. For example, 
Rebo was allegedly aware of some of Massey's comments 
and conflicting directives to Cardenas but failed to prevent 
them. He also controlled personnel assignments resulting in 
disproportionate numbers of both minorities and trainees in 
Cardenas' unit, and somehow the fact that Rebo had 
selected Cardenas in part based on his ethnicity became 
common knowledge in ISD. Moreover, Rebo failed to 
recommend Cardenas' reclassification after assigning 
Cardenas duties which he had previously used to help 
justify a reclassification for another employee and after 
Cardenas' successful negotiations with AT&T. Finally, Rebo 
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reviewed and approved Massey's allegedly disparate 
performance reviews of his subordinates. A reasonable jury 
could conclude from the available evidence that Rebo was 
deliberately indifferent to, or participated in, Massey's 
alleged harassment of Cardenas. There is sufficient basis to 
raise a question of fact as to Rebo's liability on the basis of 
intentional discrimination under the LAD and under 
S 1981. We will, therefore, reverse the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment to Rebo and remand for further  
proceedings.11 
 
VI. 
 
To summarize, we will reverse the District Court's order 
granting summary judgment for defendants on Cardenas' 
disparate pay claims and remand for a determination on 
the merits as to those claims; we will reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment to New Jersey on 
Cardenas' claim of a hostile work environment under Title 
VII and the LAD; we will reverse the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment on behalf of Rebo on Cardenas' claim 
of a hostile work environment under S 1981 and the LAD, 
and in all other respects we will affirm the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment. 
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11. We have found it difficult to discern the bases of some of Cardenas' 
claims. On remand, the District Court may use the procedures available 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require Cardenas to narrow 
and clarify his remaining claims and their evidentiary bases. 
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